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Like many  welfare  states,  France  is faced  with  increasing  demand  for  long  term  care  (LTC)
services.  Public  LTC  coverage  has  evolved  over  the  past  15 years,  reaching  a coverage  depth
of 70%.  Nonetheless,  it does  not  provide  adequate  and equitable  ﬁnancial  protection  for
the  growing  number  of  frail  elderly  individuals,  who  are  expected  to constitute  3%  of  the
population by  the  year  2060.  Since  2005,  various  ﬁnancing  reform  proposals  have  beeneywords:
ong-term care
nsurance
ublic  ﬁnancing
eform
debated,  ranging  from  a newly  covered  risk  under  the  social  security  system  to targeted
subsidies  for  private  LTC  insurance.  However,  to date  no  reform  measure  has  been  enacted.
This article  provides  a  brief history  of  publicly  ﬁnanced  LTC  in  France  in order  to provide  a
context for  the  ongoing  debate,  including  the positions  and  relative  political  power  of  the
rs  and  
hors. Politics
rance
various stakeholde
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. Introduction
Many countries face the pressure of a rapidly grow-
ng aging population. In France, this is due to increased
ife expectancy but not to declining fertility rates, as, for
nstance, in Germany and Japan. The post-World War  II
aby  boom effect will exacerbate this trend in the medium
erm,  and the population aged over 75 years is expected to
early  double by 2050, representing 15.6% of the popula-
ion  compared to 8% today [1]. Because the probability of
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becoming dependent greatly increases with age, the num-
ber  of frail elderly persons is expected to grow 40% by 2030
and  60% by 2060, rising from 1.15 million in 2010 to 1.55
million  in 2030 and 2.3 million by 2060, corresponding to
an  estimated 3% of the population. As a result, there is an
increasing need for long term care (LTC) to provide personal
assistance to frail elderly persons at home or in nursing
facilities or other residential care settings. In 2010, French
LTC  spending was estimated at D34 billion, or 1.73% of GDP,
of  which 70% was publicly funded [2,3].
Because of its expense, the increasing demand for LTC
services has driven welfare state governments to search for
solutions  to ensure equity of access through public ﬁnan-
cial  protection. These policies have taken various forms in
the  past three decades [4]. In 1995, Germany established
a universal LTC social insurance system ﬁnanced largely
through payroll taxes with beneﬁts in the form of cash or
in-kind  services. In 2000, Japan created a public insurance
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.system funded by a combination of premiums and taxes
that  ﬁnances approved in-kind services.
In France, public coverage of LTC has evolved over time,
particularly the last 15 years [5]. Today, however, coverage
r CC BY-NC-ND license.
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wage-earner income equivalent to an unpaid working
day.
3 Since 1998, as a result of attempts to broaden the social security sys-
tem’s ﬁnancial base, employees’ payroll contributions have fallen from
6.8% to currently 0.85% of gross earnings. They were mainly replaced by
an  earmarked tax introduced in 1991 called the ‘general social contribu-
tion’ (CSG) based on total income. The CSG rate varies depending on the
source of income. It initially had a two-level rate but slowly evolved to214 K. Chevreul, K. Berg Brigham
is inadequate, and ﬁnancing reform has been called for
since  2005 [6]. Various initiatives have been announced,
but none has been enacted. This paper describes the
development of the ﬁnancial protection system through
2004. It explores the different reform options that have
been  proposed as well as possible explanations for the
government’s inaction to date.
2. Addressing the need for ﬁnancial protection for
LTC:  a history
Shortly after the establishment in 1945 of the social
security system (SSS), which offered beneﬁts including
social health insurance (SHI) and social retirement insur-
ance  (SRI), the question of addressing the need for publicly
ﬁnanced LTC was raised. Designated hospitals for poor and
isolated  frail elderly persons existed as early as the 18th
century [7] and have been covered by SHI since its cre-
ation. The Laroque1 report in the early 1960s [8] introduced
the “maintenance at home” policies, including the creation
of  at-home services along with adequate public cover-
age  to ensure access, thus constituting a genuine public
policy. SSS participated by offering coverage for at-home
services such as catering, shopping and housekeeping
under SRI and personal care for hygiene or commu-
nity nursing services under SHI. Fiscal rebates were also
introduced.
The  SHI funding shortage associated with the 1970s
ﬁnancial crisis and the increasing demand for hospital facil-
ities  led to the creation of “long term care sections” in
retirement homes in lieu of expanded hospital capacity.
Limited to 25% of a home’s capacity, this section provided
LTC ﬁnanced by SHI to elderly individuals needing care,
who  paid the same lodging and catering fees as other retire-
ment  home residents. In addition to providing additional
capacity, this option decreased SSS expenditure and shifted
a  share of the cost to users, who previously paid almost
nothing for catering fees in hospitals.2
Local authorities (called départements) have always
been involved in policies for the elderly. However, prior
to  decentralization in 1980 their participation in LTC was
marginal, consisting mainly of social aid for lodging in
retirement homes, a responsibility they maintain today.
Thereafter, local authorities were charged with disability
policies, including ﬁnancial responsibility for an allowance
established in 1975 to pay for LTC services for handicapped
people (ACTP; allocation compensatrice tierce personne).
However, because of unclear wording in the legislative
texts, by 1993 over 70% of beneﬁciaries were frail dis-
abled  elderly individuals at home or in nursing homes.
This resulted in ﬁnancial difﬁculties for local authori-
ties due to annual cost increases of nearly 10% [9]. In
1996,  the annual cost for frail elderly was equivalent to
D960  million.
1 Pierre Laroque was  the author of the laws establishing the French
Social Security system.
2 The hospital catering fee is approximately one-quarter of the fee
charged in nursing homes, and often that fee is not applicable if the patient
has 100% SHI coverage due to a qualifying long-term illness. Policy 111 (2013) 213– 220
As a result, the ﬁrst speciﬁc LTC ﬁnancing reform was
enacted in 1997. It established a means-tested allowance
for elderly individuals with resources under approximately
D1000 per month called the PSD (prestation spéciﬁque
dépendence) and administered by local authorities. An
ofﬁcial  6-level grid (AGGIR) [10] was used to deﬁne a per-
son’s  level of dependency/disability, which determined the
amount  covered in a nursing home and the maximum
amount for covered services at home, where an assess-
ment of individual need was  made resulting in a “care
plan”. The allowance successfully reduced local authori-
ties’  expenditure to D760 million in 1999 because of its
lower  income ceiling and because it provided for recovery
of  expenses from elderly persons’ estates after death, which
was  a deterrent to participation. While the number of frail
elderly  in need of care was estimated at around 800,000,
in  2001 only 175,000 beneﬁted from ﬁnancial protection
(measures are summarized in Table 1).
In order to improve access, PSD was  transformed into
APA  (Allocation personnalisée d’autonomie). Unlike PSD, it
provides  universal coverage and abolishes recovery of
expenses from estates. As under PSD, beneﬁts are need-
based, but the level of coverage is means-tested, with an
income-related user co-payment. APA enlarges access to
an  additional level of dependency, covering the four high-
est  AGGIR levels as opposed to three previously. To fund
the  expected additional expenditure, a mixed system of
funding  was  organized. In addition to local authorities’ con-
tributions,  a national funding source was established to
generate  additional revenue and reduce disparities in local
authorities’ funding capacities. It was initially ﬁnanced by
a  0.1% contribution to the general social contribution rate,3
the revenue-based tax that ﬁnances SSS and is higher for
wage-based revenue than pensions.
APA was  far more successful than expected, and by 2003
the  number of beneﬁciaries approached 800,000, increas-
ing  to 1 million in 2006 and 1.2 million in 2012. Following
the  2003 summer heat wave during which 15,000 frail
elderly died, a 2004 reform was enacted to improve the
quality  and capacity of LTC. It was ﬁnanced by a “soli-
darity and autonomy contribution” (CSA), a 0.3% tax ona  range with a higher rate for revenue from capital or from gaming (for
example, lotteries and casinos) and a lower rate applicable to revenues
of those with low incomes. It is 7.5% on earned income (of which 5.1%
goes to SHI), 8.2% on capital (5.95% for SHI), 9.5% on winnings from gam-
bling, 6.6% on pensions and 6.2% on beneﬁts (for example, allowances for
sick  leave and maternity leave). This rate is decreased to 3.8% of earned
income for those with low incomes who  are exempted from income taxa-
tion, which represents almost half of all French households. As such, CSG
can  be considered a progressive tax. A share of CSG contributions is gener-
ally  tax deductible from income: 5.1% on earned income, 4.2% on beneﬁts
and 3.8% on other sources of revenue. In 2007, 70% of the money raised
via the CSG was directed to SHI.
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Table 1
Summary of LTC measures implemented and their main characteristics.
Name of
Policy
Year/law Circumstances/
objectives
Description Additional source
of  funding
Options
considered and
rejected
Implications
for equity
Results Political wing Financial
situation
Political
power
PSD 1997 Law
of  24
January
1997
– Use of the
allowance for
handicapped
persons  by
elderly  cost:
D0.96  billion in
1996
–  Contain cost for
local  authorities
–  Allowance
means-tested
– Variable access
based  on level of
dependency
–  Covers 3
highest of 6
levels  of
dependency
None  Raising
additional
revenue
Decreases
equity of
access  by
decreasing
coverage
Decrease in expenditure by
local authorities to D0.76
billion in 1999
Right  Bad Weak
APA  2001 Law
of  21 July
2001
– Under-
development of
PSD:  only
145,000 persons
covered while
frail  elderly are
estimated  at
800,000
–  Increase
coverage up to
800,000  in 4
years
–  Universal
coverage
– Income-related
beneﬁt: level of
co-insurance
depends  on
income
–  Covers 4
highest levels of
dependency
–  Local tax
–  Transfer of 0.1%
of  national SSS tax
on  revenue (CSG)
– Social
insurance
system as part
of  the SSS
–  Additional
increase of CSG
by  0.1% to
secure  funding
– Local taxes:
Increases
geographic
inequity
–  Some are
not
proportional
to  income and
thus  more
regressive
– Very successful beyond
expectations
–  Number of persons covered
increased  up to 1.2 million in
2011
Left Good Neutral
Law
modifying
the  APA
2003 Law
of  31
March
2003
– D1.2 billion
annual shortfall
in  fund for
ﬁnancing APA
–  Expected
number of
beneﬁciaries
increased to
700,000  while
500,000 expected
in 2003
–  Shift D400
million to local
authorities
–  Shift D400
million to users
–  Government
borrowing of
D400  million for
3  years
None Additional
increase of CSG
by  0.1%
– Decreases
fair ﬁnancing
–  Increases
geographical
inequity
Right Good Good
CSA  2004 Law
of  30 June
2004
Increase national
funding  of APA
Workers  give up
one  day of wages
to  increase
funding for APA
–  0.3% on income of
wage  earners only,
excluding  retirees
and  self-employed
–  0.3% on estate
revenues and
investment
products
– Increasing
CSG by 0.1%
–  0.3% on all
income
Decreases
equity in
ﬁnancing
– APA cost for local
authorities  increased from
D1.8 billion in 2003 to D2.8
billion  in 2006 and D3.8 in
2012 (8.8% of annual
increase),  while state
expenditure  increased by
less than D0.3 billion (0.9% of
annual increase)
–  the local authorities share
increased  from 57% to 69%
Right Good Good
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Fig. 1. Trends in the APA and central government’s share since 2002. In blue (left bar for each year): total expenditure. In green (right bar for each year):
9/l12-0
state  participation.
Direction générale de la cohésion sociale, http://www.senat.fr/rap/l12-05
3. Proposed reform options for funding LTC
By 2006 two major questions were raised: how to
ensure the sustainability of APA funding given the rapidly
increasing ﬁnancial burden on local authorities (2.8 times
higher  in 2006 than 2002; Fig. 1) and how to decrease
the burden of user charges that exceed the average rev-
enue  of elderly persons due to the cost of lodging and
catering fees in nursing homes (D1800 on average in
2009 [1,11]). An estimated additional D400 million will be
required  annually for the next 20 years to ﬁnance the antic-
ipated  care needs of the elderly and dependent population
[12].
By  the end of 2007, the newly elected right-wing
government planned to establish an insurance scheme
covering LTC as part of SSS. However, the reform was
postponed many times to 2008, 2009, then 2011 and ulti-
mately  was not enacted. Moreover, in the debate, there
was  a shift from a SSS-type system to a ﬁnancial protection
system encompassing a range of options [13,14]: (1) rais-
ing  additional funds to strengthen the current system; (2)
increasing  elderly individuals’ ability to fund user charges;
(3)  switching to a new system of ﬁnancial protection (see
Table  2).
Raising additional revenue implies an increase in public
levies,  which the right-wing government had promised
not to do and which had been avoided in creating PSD in591.pdf.
1997  and modifying APA in 2003. An equalization of social
tax  rates (CSG and CSA) for certain populations, mainly
elderly and self-employed persons, to the levels applicable
to  the rest of the population was  proposed by most experts
and  in most parliamentary reports [1,12,15]. However,
these favored populations are classically part of the
right-wing electorate. Similarly, recovery of charges from
elderly  beneﬁciaries’ estates was  unthinkable because of
its  intense unpopularity as illustrated by the deterrent
effect it had under the PSD in 1997.
The ability of an individual to pay user charges increases
if  he buys complementary private insurance or has recourse
to  his estate or life insurance savings while alive. This
proposal is as unpopular with the elderly population as
recovery of charges from estates. Of all options, private LTC
insurance  was  the government’s favorite because it does
not  require increased taxes and ﬁnancial incentives could
be  developed to assist the poorest individuals in purchas-
ing  contracts. It had the advantage of being politically viable
because  it was not seen by the general public as creating
inequity and the proposed ﬁnancial incentives were popu-
lar.  While France is the second largest world market after
the  US for LTC insurance [16], a model contract is necessary
in  order to implement government subsidies. However,
negotiations with insurance ﬁrms reached an impasse as
insurers  insisted on using their own risk assessment tools
rather  than the public 6-level grid and also wanted to
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Table 2
Summary of LTC policy options after 2006 and their main characteristics.
Policy
option
Description Additional source of
funding
Implications for equity Stakeholders’ positions Government’s
political will
Remarks
2007–2011: Right-wing Sarkozy presidency
Strengthen the current system: raise additional revenues
Increase  SSS tax on retirees Increase the SSS tax (CSG) on
retirees’ revenues from 6.6% to
wage earner level (7.5%)
Raises D1.2 billion Increases equity Opposition from
retirees  expected
Weak Government strongly opposed to
increasing taxes
Double  CSA Raises  an additional
D2.3  billion
Neutral Strong opposition from
wage  earners’ unions
Weak Government strongly opposed to
increasing taxes
Broaden  CSA base Broaden CSA base to include
self-employed  and retirees
– 0.3% on all kinds of
income
–  Raises an additional
D0.95  billion
Increases equity in
ﬁnancing
Strong opposition by
self-employed  unions
and  retirees
Weak Government is strongly opposed to
increasing taxes
Self-employed and retirees are
classically part of the right-wing
electorate
Eliminate  tax advantages
of  retirees
Raises approx. D2.8
billion
Increases equity in
ﬁnancing
Opposition from
retirees
Weak Retirees are classically part of the
right wing electorate
Recovery  of charges from
elderly  beneﬁciaries’
estates
Part of the beneﬁts paid by local
health authorities to
beneﬁciaries  are recovered from
their estates after death
Unknown Increases equity in
ﬁnancing
Strong opposition from
retirees
Weak  Retirees are classically part of the
right-wing electorate
Increase  individual ability to fund user charges
Voluntary complementary
private  insurance
incentive
– Tax incentives for purchasing a
contract
– Offers cash beneﬁts
Does not raise
additional funds for
public  ﬁnancial
protection
Decreases equity in
ﬁnancing
Unknown Strong Solution preferred by the
government.
However,  negotiations with
insurance ﬁrms failed.
Insurance  companies wanted to
use their own assessment tools to
estimate risk and adjust premiums
rather than the national
dependency  grid.
Recourse  to elderly
beneﬁciary’s estate and
use of life insurance
savings  while they are
alive
Setting  up of new rules for life
tenancy and use of use of life
insurance savings to pay for
lodging and catering fees in
nursing homes
Unknown Decreases equity Opposition from
retirees  expected
None Retirees are classically part of the
right-wing electorate
Switch  to another system
SSS system No longer under local
authorities’  responsibility
CSG increase from 0.1%
raises  D1.1 billion
Increases equity Strong opposition by
local  authorities
Very weak Proposed several times including
in 2001 when APA was enacted, in
2004 when CSA was enacted, and
in 2007 during the election
campaign.  Easily understandable
by  people.
However, this option implies
increased public levies, while
public spending is 0.55% of GDP
and the right-wing government
opposed an increase in spending
and promised not to rise taxes.
218
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Table 2 (Continued )
Policy
option
Description Additional source of
funding
Implications for equity Stakeholders’ positions Government’s
political will
Remarks
Universal compulsory
private  insurance system
–Everyone required to purchase
LTC  contract starting at 40– 50
years old
–  Premiums depend on age on
entering the system
–  Voucher for those with lower
incomes
A D33 monthly
premium should result
in  D300–700 cash
beneﬁt
Increases inequity – Unknown
– Did not enter the
public  debate
–  But strong opposition
by  local authorities and
a  good share of the
public  would be
expected
Weak – Adapted from the “ElderShield”
system  in Singapore
–  Contrasting opinions in the
majority
– 2 parliamentary reports in
opposition [12,15]
2012:  Left-wing Hollande presidency
Strengthen the current system: raise additional revenues
CASA,  Additional CSA – Broaden CSA base to include
retirees  and disability pensions
but not self-employed income
– Individuals with lower incomes
exempted
–  95% of revenue will be used to
ﬁnance APA
0.3%  on pensions raises
an  additional annual
D0.6  billion
Strong  Measures included in the 2013
Social Security Finance law [18,19]
by the newly elected left-wing
government,  which wants to
support the role of local authorities
(all are left wing) and has
announced  a reform for 2014
mainly focusing on improving
prevention  of dependency.
Support  for this policy option
clearly expresses opposition to the
development of private insurance.
First message to retirees that they
will participate in the ﬁnancing of
their future dependence.
Broaden  CSA base Broaden CSA base to include
self-employed  and retirees
– 0.3% on all kinds of
income  raises an
additional  D0.95 billion
Increases equity in
ﬁnancing
Strong  opposition by
self-employed  unions
and  retirees “who are
mainly  right wing”
Unknown Law not offered by the government
but  proposed and accepted by the
Senate (Senate majority is left
wing) in October 2012 in order to
alert the government that the
enlargement of the CSA base
should be broadened to include the
self-employed [20]
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dapt premiums over time, which would have exacerbated
nequity of access to private insurance.
This effect on equity explains why a dramatic change
rom the APA to the fully private compulsory insurance
ystem proposed in 2010 [15] was not examined further.
nterestingly, a switch to a social insurance system under
SS,  ﬁrst evoked in the 1990s, was explored both in 2001
hen  the APA was developed and in 2004 when the CSA
as  created and has been invoked several times since 2006.
owever,  it has never been the preferred option regard-
ess  of which political wing controlled the government
r its political power at the time. There are several rea-
ons  for this, notably two. There is no agreement on who
ould  manage this new risk (SHI, SRI. . .), but in any case it
ould  not be at the local level. Local authorities are strongly
pposed to giving up responsibility for LTC because of the
isibility  and political power it has provided them since
ecentralization in 1982 [14]. Moreover, while the French
opulation generally favors public intervention for LTC
68%  in 2009), only 50% would agree to pay a new social
ax  which, on top of the risk of further impairing the ﬁscal
alance, made the decision of raising a new tax politically
isky [13,16].
.  Discussion
France has a long history of public coverage of LTC and
as  achieved a 70% coverage depth that is relatively good.
owever, coverage varies widely among elderly people
epending on their needs. The growing need for public
unding in the coming decades is estimated to be three
imes higher than the expected growth of the population,
hich further threatens equity in ﬁnancing.
While the SSS system was the main funding source for
TC  after its creation, in the last four decades local author-
ties’  responsibility for funding LTC has grown following
he creation of a universal allowance with a means-
ested co-insurance. Overall, this can be regarded as a
hift  from national solidarity-based ﬁnancial protection to
ocal  tax-based ﬁnancial protection. Despite the attempt
o  compensate for disparities among local authorities
hrough a national funding source allocated based on needs
nd  wealth criteria, this shift has increased geographi-
al inequity. Moreover, it is more regressive, particularly
ecause a share of local taxes is not income-based. This sit-
ation  will worsen if no action is taken to reinforce national
olidarity.
Increasing equity in ﬁnancing by equalizing the LTC tax
reatment of the entire population would be a logical ﬁrst
tep.  The previous right-wing government did not do so in
rder  to cater to its electorate. The left-wing government
lected in May  2012 appears willing to address this issue.
owever, increasing self-employed and retiree taxes up to
he  general population level will not be sufﬁcient to ﬁnance
he  anticipated demand in the medium to long run.
A  genuine political and societal choice is needed in order
o  strike the right balance between increasing the abil-
ty  of elderly persons to use their own assets to pay for
are  and increasing solidarity. The new government has
nnounced an LTC reform for 2014 to be phased in over
he  course of the presidency that is designed to improve Policy 111 (2013) 213– 220 219
dependency prevention and quality of care but that does
not  speciﬁcally mention ﬁnancing. As further evidence
of  this reticence, none of the three working groups set
up  by the government to address aging issues addressed
this question in the reports they released in March 2013
[17].  Unlike the 2007–2011 period when LTC ﬁnancing
reform was announced by the President and entrusted
to powerful ministers, this reform was  announced by
the  newly appointed delegate minister, who has little
power in the government and is unknown by the gen-
eral  population. Given the signiﬁcant level of political
support necessary to achieve ﬁnancing reform, these devel-
opments  do not offer much reason for optimism in the
short  term.
Acknowledgements
We  thank Annick Bonny for her helpful insights into the
policy  process, for the information and gray literature she
provided  and for her time.
References
[1] Vasselle A. Rapport d’information fait au nom de la mission commune
d’information sur la prise en charge de la dépendance et la création
du cinquième risque. Sénat Rapport No 263; January 2011. Available
at http://www.senat.fr/rap/r10-263/r10-2631.pdf
[2]  Charpin J-M, Tlili C. Perspectives démographiques et ﬁnancières de la
dépendance. Comité interministériel sur la dépendance, Rapport du
Groupe de travail; June 2011. Available at http://www.social-sante.
gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/rapport g2 def-2.pdf
[3]  Stratégie pour la couverture de la dépendance des personnes
âgées.  Comité interministériel sur la dépendance, Rapport du
Groupe de travail No 4, June 2011. Available at http://www.
ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/
114000335/0000.pdf
[4]  Gleckman H. Long-term care ﬁnancing reform: Lessons from the U.S.
and abroad. The Commonwealth Fund; February 2010. Available
at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/ /media/Files/Publications/
Fund%20Report/2010/Feb/1368 Gleckman longterm care ﬁnancing
reform lessons US abroad.pdf
[5] Chevreul K, Durand-Zaleski I, Bahrami S, Hernandez-Quevedo C,
Mladovsky P. France Health system review. Health Systems in
Transition; 2010. Available at http://www.euro.who.int/ data/
assets/pdf ﬁle/0008/135809/E94856.pdf?bcsi scan 6893803136
ef8dee=1
[6]  Les personnes âgées dépendantes: Rapport au Président de la
République suivi des réponses des administrations et des organ-
ismes intéressés. Cour des Comptes, November 2005. Available
at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-
publics/054000746/0000.pdf
[7]  Ennuyer B. 1962–2007: regards sur les politiques du « main-
tien  à domicile », Gérontologies et société, vol.123, 153–167;
2007.  Available at http://www.cairn.info/revue-gerontologie-
et-societe-2007-4-page-153.htm
[8] Haut Comité consultatif de la population et de la famille. Rapport de
la Commission d’Etudes des Problèmes de la Vieillesse présidée par
P. Laroque. Paris: La Documentation franc¸ aise, 1962.
[9] Oudin J. Avis présenté au nom de la commission des Finances, du
contrôle budgétaire et des comptes économiques de la Nation sur
le projet de loi instituant une prestation d‘autonomie pour les per-
sonnes âgées dépendantes; 1995. Available at http://www.senat.
fr/rap/a95-045/a95-0451.pdf
10]  Joël M-E, Dufour-Kippelen S, Duchêne C, Marmier M.  Long-term
care in France. ANCIEN project; June 2010. Available at http://www.
ceps.eu/book/long-term-care-system-elderly-france
11] Branchu C, Voisin J, Guedj J, Lacaze D, Paul S. Etat des lieux
relatif  à la composition des coûts mis  à la charge des résidents
des  établissements d‘hébergement pour personnes âgées dépen-
dantes (EHPAD), IGAS; October 2009. Available at http://www.
ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/
094000473/0000.pdf
 / Health
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[20]  Proposition de loi tendant à élargir la contribution de solidarité pour
l’autonomie aux travailleurs non salariés et aux retraités et à com-220 K. Chevreul, K. Berg Brigham
12] Gisserot H. Perspectives ﬁnancières de la dépendance des personnes
âgées a l’horizon 2025: prévisions et marges de choix; March 2007.
Available at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/
rapports-publics/074000235/0000.pdf?bcsi scan
628cd39dca2568d2=0&bcsi scan ﬁlename=0000.pdf
13]  Le Bihan B, Martin C. Reforming long-term care policy in France:
private-public complementarities. Social Policy & Administration
2010;44:392–410.
14]  Frinault TLa. Réforme Franc¸ aise de l’allocation dépendance ou com-
ment bricoler une politique publique, vol 55; 2005. p. 607–32.
15] Rosso-Debord V. Assemblée Nationale Rapport d’information
No  2647; June 2010. Available at http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/13/pdf/rap-info/i2647.pdf
16]  David M.  L’évolution des opinions des Franc¸ ais sur les ques-
tions sociales entre 2002 et 2007. Etudes et Résultats No. 652;
August 2008. Available at http://www.drees.sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/
er652.pdf
17]  Premier Ministre. Rapports Aquino, Broussy et Pinville, en vue de
la future loi d’adaptation de la société au vieillissement, March Policy 111 (2013) 213– 220
2013. Available at http://www.gouvernement.fr/presse/rapports-
aquino-broussy-et-pinville-en-vue-de-la-future-loi-d-adaptation-
de-la-societe-au-vie
18] Kerdraon R. Rapport sur le projet de loi de ﬁnancement de la sécu-
rité sociale pour 2013. Sénat No 107; November 2012. Available at
http://www.senat.fr/rap/l12-107-3/l12-107-31.pdf
19]  Loi no 2012-1404 du 17 décembre 2012 de ﬁnancement
de  la sécurité sociale pour 2013. Available at http://www.
legifrance.gouv.fr/afﬁchTexteArticle.do;jsessionid=
27AEEA100581FE0EB11CD5D01087BAA2.tpdjo10v 1?idArticle=
JORFARTI000026785476&cidTexte=JORFTEXT000026785322
&dateTexte=29990101&categorieLien=idpenser aux départements la moitié de leurs dépenses d’allocation
personnalisée  d’autonomie. Sénat Rapport No 391, February 2012.
Available at http://www.senat.fr/leg/ppl11-391.pdf
